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Abstract. This paper studies the problem of reasoning about flow se-
curity properties in virtualised computing networks with mobility from
perspective of formal language. We propose a distributed process algebra
CSP4v with security labelled processes for the purpose of formal mod-
elling of virtualised computing systems. Specifically, information leakage
can come from observations on process executions, communications and
from cache side channels in the virtualised environment. We describe a
cache flow policy to identify such flows. A type system of the language is
presented to enforce the flow policy and control the leakage introduced
by observing behaviours of communicating processes and behaviours of
virtual machine (VM) instances during accessing shared memory cache.
Keywords: information flow control, language-based security,
cache non-interference, virtualised computing systems.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing has attracted interests in both the scientific and the indus-
trial computing communities due to its ability to provide flexible, configurable,
and cost-effective computing resources delivered over the internet. In cloud sys-
tems, computing resources are shared among multiple clients. This is achieved
by virtualisation in which a collection of virtual machines (VMs) are running
upon the same platform under the management of the hypervisor. Virtualisa-
tion allows computing service providers to maximise the utilisation of the devices
and minimise the costs by creating multiple VMs over a shared physical infras-
tructure. However, such services can also bring additional channel threat, and
introduce information leakage between unrelated entities during the procedure
of resource sharing and communications through unintended covert channels.
To address this concern, this paper proposes to develop formal approaches to
specifying, modelling and analysing flow security properties in virtualised com-
puting networks, which are the key underpin of contemporary society such as
cloud computing.
Specifically, information leakage can come from observations on both pro-
gram executions and cache usage in the virtualised environment. On the one
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hand, for processes running upon a particular VM instance, consider the pro-
cesses are communication channels, sensitive inputs can be partially induced
by observing public outputs of the processes regarding choices of public inputs.
On the other hand, shared caches enable competing VM instances to extract
sensitive information from each other. CPU cache, a small section of memory
built in the CPU for fast memory access, is one of the highest-rate measurable
resources shared by multiple processes [32]. Therefore cache-based side-channel
attack becomes one of the major attack on VMs and receives the most atten-
tion in the cloud environment [24]. Consider a malicious VM repeatedly access
shared cache memory to perform cache-based side-channel attacks. Such attacks
allow one virtual machine to effectively steal secrets of another hosted machine
in the same cloud environment. More precisely, for processes running upon dif-
ferent VM instances, cache usage can be considered as a communication channel.
Consider the cache lines accessed by the victim instance and by the malicious
instance as high level input and low level input respectively, by observing the us-
age (such as time) of victim cache lines (low output), the malicious observer can
learn some information of the victim instance. In summary, this paper considers
distributed virtualised computing environment where the attacker VM steals the
information from the target one by observing executions of victim processes, and
by probing and measuring the usage (timing) of the shared cache.
In particular, we develop an approach from the software language-based level
to enforce the applications to access shared cache and to bring interferences in a
predictable way. As a result, we aim to prevent the leakage introduced by such
cache timing channel and the interference between security objects caused by
executions. First, we propose a CSP-like language for modelling communicating
processes running upon VMs with mobility in the computing environment. Sec-
ond, we formalise a cache flow policy to specify the security condition regarding
the threat model we focus on. Finally, we describe a type system of the language
to enforce the flow policy and control the leakage introduced by observing the
system behaviours. More specifically, we give an identifying label to each VM
instance, and partition the cache into a set of page-sized blocks, each block in
pages is mapped to a set of cache lines and is dynamically granted the label of its
owner (the VM instance it is allocated to). The label of the block will be revoked
when its owner terminates. In addition, programming variables and cache lines
are assigned security labels to denote the security levels of the data they store.
VM instances and hosts are assigned to different categories for the purpose of
controlling information flow introduced by processes and VM instances move-
ments. When a guest VM is launched, the VM manager allocates cache pages to
it regarding its requests. During the running time of the VM process, operation
of cache lines is allowed only if it satisfies the specified flow policy. Processes
are allowed to move from one VM to another, and VM instances are allowed
to move from one host to another. However, movements from a lower-ordered
category carrier to a higher one are not allowed. Furthermore, we only allow
the communicating process access the cache within a certain time in order to
prevent timing leaks by observing the usage of the cache. These regulations are
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enforced by the semantics and the typing rules we formalised. When the guest
VM terminates, the relevant cache pages are initialised, and released to the VM
manager to prevent flushing of the pages by a malicious VM.
Outline. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes our language for
modelling basic virualised computing networks. Section 3 describes the threat
model we focus on. Section 4 specifies cache flow policy which the processes
should satisfy in our model. Section 5 presents a type system to enforce the
cache flow policy. Section 6 briefly reviews literature in the related areas.
2 The Modelling Language CSP4v
This section presents a dialect of communicating sequential processes (CSP) [10]
language CSP4v for formal modelling of and reasoning about virtualised comput-
ing network systems considered in this paper. Such an environment can be con-
sidered as a distribute computing system, in which a group of inter-connected and
virtualised computers are dynamically allocated for serving. Processes can move
from one VM to another and communicate to each other via sending/receiving
messages. Applications and data are stored and processed in the network but can
be accessed from any location using a client. It is natural to specify and describe
the system as a set of communicating processes in a network with consideration
of resource sharing in a predictable way. A CSP-like language is therefore a good
choice for modelling of such systems.
2.1 Terminology and notation
We consider the infrastructure consists of a set of virtual private networks (VPNs)
upon which a set of virtual machines (VMs) can communicate with each other. A
VPN may include one or more VMs, and the location of VMs can be viewed as a
node (host) of the VPN it belongs to. An instance is a VM upon which a number
of processes locate and run. Let I denote a set of instances, I = {I, I1, . . . , In}.
Processes (P, P1, . . . ) can be constructed from a set of atomic actions called
events (e, e1, . . . ), or be composed using operators to create more complex be-
haviours. The full set of actions that a system may perform is called the alphabet
(Σ). The operators are required to obey algebraic laws which can be used for
formal reasoning. The interactions carrying data values between processes take
place through “channels”. From an information theory point of view, a storage
device such as cache which can be received from (reading) and sent to (writ-
ing) is also a kind of communication channel. CPU data caches locate between
the processor cores and the main memory. We assume the clients (including the
attacker) know the map between memory locations and cache sets, so we omit
the details of the mapping and focus on cache organisation and operation here.
Cache can be viewed as a set of cache lines: CLines = {li|0 ≤ i ≤ n} where n
denotes the size of the cache.
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In addition, in order to encode the desired features of the language for flow
secure virtualised computing systems, we assign security labels into variables
and cache lines (channels), and allocate cache lines into instances via mappings:
τv : Vars 7→τv  L, τc : CLines 7→τc  L, αc : CLines 7→αc I
where  L denotes a security lattice. We write τ in stead τv and τc in general for
cases without introducing any confusion. Furthermore, we consider VM hosts
are assigned to different categories ΩH , with an ordering of subset relations:
βh : Hosts 7→βh ΩH .
For instance, h1 is assigned to category: Ω1 = {student}, h2 is assigned to
category: Ω2 = {student, staff}, and thus h1 ⊑ h2 since Ω1 ⊆ Ω2. Similarly,
we also assign VM instances into different sub-categories ΩI , with an ordering
of subset relations:
βi : VMs 7→βi ΩI .
For instance, P running upon VM i1 belonging to sub-category: ω1 = {UG-1} ⊆
student,Q running upon VM i2 belonging to sub-category: ω2 = {UG-1, UG-2} ⊆
student, and ω1 ⊆ ω2, so i1 ⊑ i2.
2.2 Syntax
Table 1 presents the syntax of the language CSP4v . Expressions can be vari-
Expressions exp ::= Vars | Ch | Ints | exp⊕ exp (⊕ ∈ {+,−, ∗, /})
Boolean expresssions b ::= true | ¬b | b ∧ b | exp ⊲⊳ exp (⊲⊳∈ {>,≥, <,≤,==})
Process x := exp | STOP | SKIP | SLEEP(∆t) |
MOVEP (i) | P ;Q | P ⊳ b⊲Q | b⊲ (P )
∗ |
a!w | a?x | P‖Q
VM instances I ::= [[P ]] | MOVEI(h) | I‖I
′
Hosts H ::= i : [[I ]].MI | H‖H
′
VPN networks G ::= h : [[H ]] | G‖G′
Table 1. Syntax of CSP4v
ables, channels, integers and arithmetic operations (denoted by ⊕) between ex-
pressions.
Operator x := exp assigns the value of exp to process variable x. Action
operator STOP denotes the inactive processes that does nothing and indicates a
failure to terminate, and delayable operator SLEEP(∆t) allows the process to do
nothing and wait for ∆t time units. Moving operator MOVEP (i) allows a process
P to be able to move from current VM to another one i. We require that VM
processes running upon on a VM instance with lower (category) order are not
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allowed to move to a VM instance with a higher (category) order. Operator
P ;Q denotes the sequential composition of processes P and Q. Branch operator
P⊳b⊲Q defines if the boolean expression b is true then behaves like P otherwise
behaves like Q. Sending operator a!(w) will output a value in expression w over
channel a to an agent, and receiving operator a?x allows us to input a data value
during an interaction over channel a and write it into variable x of an agent.
P‖Q denotes the synchronous parallel composition of processes P and Q. Loop
operator b⊲ (P )∗ denotes the loop operation of process P while b is true.
An instance I is a virtual machine (VM) hosted on a network infrastructure.
Operator [[P ]] defines the VM upon which process P runs. Operator MOVEI(h)
allows VM instances (with all processes running on it) to migrate from current
host machine to another host h to keep the instance running even when an
event, such as infrastructure upgrade or hardware failure, occurs. Similarly to
the process movement, we require that VM instances running upon on a host
with lower (category) order are not allowed to move to a host with a higher
(category) order. So, in the previous example, instances running upon h1 are
not allowed to moved to h2, and P is not allowed to move to VM i2. Operator
i : [[I]].MI defines the host machine upon which I runs, MI denotes the cache
pages allocated to instance I. To ensure that no cache is shared among different
VM instances, we require that for any host h upon which any I1 and I2 are
running: I1 6= I2 ⇒MI1 ∩MI2 = ∅, and if an instance I terminates, then set MI
to be ∅ for future allocation to other instances. Virtual private network provides
connectivity for VM hosts. It can be viewed as a virtual network consisting of
a set of hosts where VM instances can run and communicate with each other.
The location of a host h : [[H ]] indicates a network node of G in which the VM
host machine locates.
2.3 Operational semantics
In order to incorporate as much parallel executions of events within different
nodes as possible, we transform the network G into a finite parallel compositions
of the form:
G = h1 : i11 : [[P11]].M11 ‖ . . . ‖ h1 : i1j1 : [[P1j1 ]].M1j1
‖ h2 : i21 : [[P21]].M21 ‖ . . . ‖ h2 : i2j2 : [[P2j2 ]].M2j2
‖ . . . . . . . . .
‖ hm : im1 : [[Pm1]].Mm1 ‖ . . . ‖ hm : imjm : [[Pmjm ]].Mmjm
where hk denotes the identifier of a host, ikj denotes the VM instance located
at hk. Each component hk : ikj : [[Pkj ]].Mkj is considered as a decomposition of
G. We argue such decomposition is well-defined by applying the following rules
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of structural equivalence:
G ‖ G′ ≡ G′ ‖ G
(G ‖ G′) ‖ G′′ ≡ G ‖ (G′ ‖ G′′)
h : [[I ‖ I ′]] ≡ h : [[I ′ ‖ I]] ≡ h : [[I]] ‖ h : [[I ′]]
h : [[(I ‖ I ′) ‖ I ′′]] ≡ h : [[I ‖ (I ′ ‖ I ′′)]]
i : [[P ‖ P ′]].Mi ≡ i : [[P
′ ‖ P ]].Mi ≡ i : [[P ]].Mi ‖ i : [[P
′]].Mi
i : [[(P ‖ P ′) ‖ P ′′]].Mi ≡ i : [[P ‖ (P
′ ‖ P ′′)]].Mi
We now define the operational semantics of CSP4v in terms of multiset labelled
transition system 〈Γ , Σ,=⇒〉, where:
– Γ is a vector of configurations of a VPN G regarding the vector of decom-
position of G. A configuration Γ , regarding a single component (say process
P ) of the decompositions of G, is defined as a tuple (σ, δ, I,H), where:
• σ : VarsP 7→ Ints denotes the store;
• δ : CAddrP 7→ (Ints ∪ {∅}) defines the possible world regarding cache;
• I specifies the owner (the VM instance identifier) of process P ;
• H specifies the host (location) of the VM instance of process P .
– Σ is a set of operating events which the processes can perform;
– =⇒⊆ Γ ×Σ × Γ is the multiset transition relations: Σ denotes a vector of
operating events for the vector of components.
The action rules of the operational semantics of CSP4v is presented in Table 2.
Notations ⇒, ⇐, ⇓ denote cache addressing, cache allocation, and evaluation
respectively. For instance, Γ ⊢ exp ⇓ v means that under configuration Γ , exp
evaluates to value v, w ⇐ CAddra means the cache allocated for expression w
locates at CAddra, and a⇒ CAddra means cache address of channel a is CAddra,
notation CAddrP is used to denote the cache addresses allocated for P .
Store is defined as a mapping from variables to values, i.e., σ : Vars 7→ Ints.
Cache is considered as a mapping from addresses (of cache lines) to integers
(cached) or ∅ (flushed), i.e., δ : CAddr 7→ (Ints ∪ {∅}).
Action rule of assignment 〈x := exp, Γ 〉 updates the configuration such that
the state of x is the value v of expression exp after the execution. Action rule
of process moving operator MOVEP (i
′) updates the configuration such that the
identifier of instance accommodating P turns to be i′ after the execution of the
process movement. Similar action rule is applied for VM instance movement from
one host to another. Action rule of sending operator a!(w) updates the configu-
ration such that the value stored in cache address (CAddra) is v, if expression w
evaluates to v under configuration before the execution and the address of cache
allocated for communicating channel a (to store expression w) is CAddra. Rule of
receiving operator a?x updates the configuration such that the state of variable
x is v, if the value stored in cache address CAddra of the communicating channel
is v under the configuration before receiving the data. In the cross-VM com-
munications over today’s common virtualised platforms, the cache transmission
scheme requires the sender and receiver could only communicate by interleaving
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Store S ::= {} | {Vars 7→ Ints} ∪ S
Cache M ::= {} | {CAddr 7→ (Ints ∪ {∅})} ∪M
Stop 〈STOP, Γ 〉 −→ Γ [δ(CAddrP ) = ∅]
Skip 〈SKIP, Γ 〉 −→ Γ
Sleep
∆t > 0
〈SLEEP(∆t), Γ 〉 −→ 〈SLEEP(∆t− 1), Γ 〉
∆t = 0
〈SLEEP(∆t), Γ 〉 −→ Γ
Assignment
Γ ⊢ exp ⇓ v
〈x := exp, Γ 〉 −→ Γ [σ(x) = v]
Move
Γ ⊢ I ⇓ i
〈MOVEP (i
′), Γ 〉 −→ Γ [I = i′]
Γ ⊢ H ⇓ h
〈MOVEI(h
′), Γ 〉 −→ Γ [H = h′]
Seq
〈P, Γ 〉 −→ 〈P ′, Γ ′〉
〈P ;Q,Γ 〉 −→ 〈P ′;Q,Γ ′〉
〈P, Γ 〉 −→ Γ ′
〈P ;Q,Γ 〉 −→ 〈Q,Γ ′〉
Branch
Γ ⊢ b ⇓ true
〈P ⊳ b⊲Q,Γ 〉 −→ 〈P, Γ 〉
Γ ⊢ b ⇓ false
〈P ⊳ b⊲Q,Γ 〉 −→ 〈Q,Γ 〉
Send
Γ ⊢ σ(w) ⇓ v w⇐ CAddra
〈a!(w), Γ 〉 −→ Γ [δ(CAddra) = v]
Recv
a⇒ CAddra Γ ⊢ δ(CAddra) ⇓ v
〈a?x, Γ 〉 −→ Γ [σ(x) = v]
Loop 〈b⊲ (P )∗, Γ 〉 −→ 〈(P ; b⊲ (P )∗)⊳ b⊲ SKIP, Γ 〉
Parallel P −→ P
′
P‖Q −→ P ′‖Q
I −→ I ′
I‖I ′′ −→ I ′‖I ′′
H −→ H ′
H‖H ′′ −→ H ′‖H ′′
G −→ G′
G‖G′′ −→ G′‖G′′
Table 2. Operational semantics of CSP4v
their executions for security concerns. In order to capture timing behaviour of
cache-related operations, we consider the cache-related operations, such as com-
municating, as time-sensitive behaviours whose lasting time is recorded. The
events are therefore considered as either non-delayable (time-insensitive, time
does not progress) actions or delayable (time-sensitive, involves passing of time
∆t) behaviour. We use ∆t(e) to denote the time duration of event e lasting for.
The behaviour of a process component can now be viewed as a set of se-
quences of timed runs.
Definition 1 (Timed run). A timed run of a component of G is a sequence
of timed configuration event pairs leading to a final configuration:
λ = 〈Γ0, (e0, ∆t0)〉 → · · · → 〈Γn, (en, ∆tn)〉 → Γ
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where, Γ0 and Γ denote the initial and final configuration respectively. ∀i ∈
{0, n}, ei is an event will take place with passing time ∆ti under configuration
Γi; if ∆ti = 0, ei is considered as an immediate event, if ∆ti > 0, ei is considered
as a time-sensitive event with lasting time ∆ti.
3 Attacker Model
We consider computing environment where malicious tenants can use observa-
tions on process executions and on the usage of shared cache to induce informa-
tion about victim tenants. We assume the service provider and the applications
running on the victim’s VM are trusted. Let us consider the attacker owns a
VM and runs a program on the system, and the victim is a co-resident VM that
shares the host machine with the attacker VM. In particular, there are two ways
in which an attacker may learn secrets from a victim process: by probing the
caches set and measuring the time to access the cache line (through the cache
timing channel), and by observing how its own executions are influenced by the
executions of victim processes.
Cache timing side channel (C1). In the virtualised computing environment,
different VMs launch on the same CPU core, CPU cache can be shared between
the malicious VM and the target ones. Consider the malicious VM program
repeatedly accesses and monitors the shared cache to learn information about
the sensitive input of the victim VM. Specifically, timings can be observed from
caches and are the most common side channels through which the attacker can
induce the sensitive information of the victim VM. Intuitively, such cache side
channel can be viewed as a communication channel, the victim and the attacker
can be viewed as the sender and the receiver respectively. We assume that the
attacker knows the map between memory locations and cache sets, and is able to
perform repeated measurements to record when the victim process accesses the
target cache line. We focus on cache timing side channel, all other side-channels
are outside our scope.
Example 1. Consider the scenario presented in Fig. 1, where VM1 (victim VM,
labelled i1) and VM2 (attacker VM, labelled i2) be two instances running upon
Host1 (labelled h1); victim processes P and Q, running over VM1, are communi-
cating to each other: P generates a key and sends it to Q, Q encrypts a message
using the received key and sends the encrypted message to P , P receives the
message and decrypts it; and attacker process R, running over VM2, keeps prob-
ing cache address of the key. Let keyGen, encrypt and decrypt denote the
function of generating a key, encryption and decryption respectively, and as-
sume cread(CAddr) is a function probes cache address CAddr: returns 1 if it is
available and returns −1 otherwise. We present the model in our language as
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Fig. 1. Composition structure of the example in networks
follows.
VPC1
df
= h1 : [[Host1]] ‖ h2 : [[Host2]]
Host1
df
= i1 : [[VM1]].MVM1 ‖ i2 : [[VM2]].MVM2
VM1
df
= [[P‖Q]] VM2
df
= [[R]]
P
df
= x := keyGen(); key!x→ P ′
Q
df
= key?y → Q′
Q′
df
= m1 := encrypt(y, “message”); msg!m1 → STOP
P ′
df
= msg?m2 → P
′′
P ′′
df
= m := decrypt(x,m2)→ STOP
R
df
= true⊲ (z := cread(CAddrkey))
∗
The communication time between P and Q is affected by the value of the key
generated. There is information flow from victim VM to malicious VM through
cache side channel.
Leakage through observations on process executions (C2). Next let us focus on
processes running upon a particular VM instance. Consider the VM instance,
upon which processes are running, as a communication channel having inputs
and outputs, which is relative to information flow from victim user to a malicious
one. The victim user controls a set of higher level inputs with confidential data.
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The attacker is an observer who may have control of lower level inputs. He has
partial observation on executions of the process, but does not have any access
to the confidential data. Specifically, the weak attacker can observe the public
result, i.e., the final public output of the programs, while the strong attacker can
observe the low state after each execution step of the processes. We consider a
process has access to confidential data via higher level inputs. The attacker tries
to collect and deduce some of the secure information about higher level inputs
by varying his inputs and observing the execution of the process.
Example 2. Consider process P and R are running upon a VM instance VM.
Process P inputs a password through channel pwd into H-level variable x, and
updates L-level variable y to be 1 if x is odd and to be 0 if x is even. Process R
output variable y through channel res:
VM
df
= [[P‖R]]
P
df
= pwd?x; y := 1⊳ (x mod 2 == 1)⊲ y := 0→ STOP
R
df
= res!(y)→ STOP
Assume L ⊏ H ∈  L. Clearly there are implicit flows from x to y by observing
L-level output of the process.
4 Information Flow Policy
Information flow is controlled by means of security labels and flow policy in-
tegrated in the language. Each of the identifiers, information container, is as-
sociated with a security label. Identifiers can refer to variables, communication
channels, and can refer to entities such as files, devices in a concrete level. The set
of the security labels forms a security lattice regarding their ordering. We study
the system flow policy which prevents information flow leakage from high-level
objects to lower levels and from a target instance to a malicious one via ob-
serving process executions and cache usage (by measuring the time of accessing
cache lines during communications).
In general, information flow policies are proposed to ensure that secret infor-
mation does not influence publicly observable information. An ideal flow policy
called Non-interference (NI) [8] is a guarantee that no information about the sen-
sitive inputs can be obtained by observing a program’s public outputs, for any
choice of its public inputs. Intuitively, the NI policy requires that low security
users should not be aware of the activity of high security users and thus not be
able to deduce any information about the behaviours of the high users. On the
one hand, for processes running upon a particular VM instance (regarding C2),
the NI policy can be applied to control information flow from high-level input to
low-level output, where state of sensitive information container (s.a. high-level
variables) and observations on behaviours of public information container (s.a.
low-level variables) are viewed as the high input and low output respectively.
On the other hand, for processes running upon different VM instances (regard-
ing C1), we adapt the NI policy here in order to control the information flow
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from processes running upon victim instance to malicious one through cache side
channel. Consider the cache side channel as a communication channel, the cache
lines accessed by the victim instance and by the malicious instance are viewed
as high level input and low level input respectively, and the observations on the
victim cache usage (s.a. hits/misses) are considered as low level outputs. Cache
flow non-interference demands the changing of the cache lines accessed by the
victim process (high inputs) does not affect the public observations on the cache
usage (low outputs). Informally, cache flow interference happens if the usage (we
focus on the accessing time) of the cache lines accessed by one victim process
affects the usage of the cache lines accessed by attacker VM processes. Fig. 2
presents some intuition of the cache NI policy discussed above.
Fig. 2. Cache non-interference
Formally, the policy of flow non-interference can be considered in terms of
the equivalence relations on the system behaviours from the observer’s view, in-
cluding the state evolution of information container and the timing behaviour of
cache accessing. This is due to the fact that the system behaviours are modelled
as timed runs with security classification of identifiers and with timing consider-
ations when accessing caches during the process communications in our model.
Definition 2 (Flow security environment). Let L be a finite flow lattice, ⊑
denote the ordering relation of L, I denote the set of VM instances running upon
any host h, ΩH and ΩI denote a set of categories for hosts and sub-categories
for instances respectively. The flow security environment is considered as:
Ξ : (τv, τc, αc, βh, βi),
where τv : Vars 7→τv  L, τc : CLines 7→τc  L, αc : CLines 7→αc I, βh : Hosts 7→βh
ΩH , βi : VMs 7→βi ΩI . Furthermore, we say Ξ ⊑ Ξ
′ iff ∀x ∈ Vars, l ∈ CLines,
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i ∈ VMs and h ∈ Hosts:
Ξ(τv(x)) ⊑ Ξ
′(τv(x)) ∧ Ξ(τc(l)) ⊑ Ξ
′(τc(l))
∧ Ξ(βh(h)) ⊑ Ξ
′(βh(h)) ∧ Ξ(βi(i)) ⊑ Ξ
′(βi(i)),
and for t ∈  L, ωI ⊆ ΩI , and ωH ⊆ ΩH , we say Ξ ⊑ (t, ωI , ωH) iff:
Ξ(τv(x)) ⊑ t ∧ Ξ(τc(l)) ⊑ t ∧ Ξ(βh(h)) ⊑ ωH ∧ Ξ(βi(i)) ⊑ ωI ,
where we abuse notation Ξ(τv(x)), Ξ(τc(l)), Ξ(βh(h)) and Ξ(βi(i)) to denote
τv(x), τc(l), βh(h) and βi(i) in environment Ξ respectively.
Definition 3 ((t, ωI , ωH)-equivalent configuration =Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH)). Consider
processes running upon hosts of VPN G, let Ξ be a security environment, t ∈  L
be a security level, ωH ⊆ ΩH be a category and ωI ⊆ ΩI be a sub-category.
For any x ∈ Vars, l ∈ CLines, assume i and h are the instance and host
which x, l belong to, we define store (t, ωI , ωH)-equivalence under Ξ as follows:
σ1(x) =Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH) σ2(x) iff:
(Ξ(τv(x)) ⊑ t ∧ Ξ(βi(i)) ⊑ ωI ∧ Ξ(βh(h)) ⊑ ωH)⇒ σ1(x) = σ2(x),
and cache line (t, ωI , ωH)-equivalence under Ξ as follows: δ1(l) =Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH) δ2(l)
iff:
(Ξ(τc(l)) ⊑ t ∧ Ξ(βi(i)) ⊑ ωI ∧ Ξ(βh(h)) ⊑ ωH)⇒ δ1(l) = δ2(l).
Furthermore, given two configurations Γ1 = (σ1, δ1, i1, h1) and Γ2 = (σ2, δ2, i2, h2),
we say Γ1 =Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH) Γ2 iff:
(∀x ∈ Vars.σ1(x) =Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH) σ2(x)) ∧ (∀l ∈ CLines.δ1(l) =Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH) δ2(l))
∧ (βi(i1) ⊑ βi(i2)) ∧ (βh(h1) ⊑ βh(h2)).
Definition 4 (Strong bisimulation
s
∼Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH) and weak bisimulation
w
∼Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH)). Consider two timed runs running upon host h under security en-
vironment Ξ:
λ = 〈Γ0, (e0, ∆t0)〉 → · · · → 〈Γn, (en, ∆tn)〉 → Γ
λ′ = 〈Γ ′0, (e
′
0, ∆t
′
0)〉 → · · · → 〈Γ
′
n, (e
′
n, ∆t
′
n)〉 → Γ
′
∀Γ0, Γ ′0 such that Γ0 =Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH) Γ
′
0, we say λ and λ
′ are strong (t, ωI , ωH)-
bisimilar to each other, i.e., λ
s
∼Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH) λ
′, iff:
∀j ∈ {0...n}.(Γj =Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH) Γ
′
j) ∧ (∆tj = ∆t
′
j);
and say λ and λ′ are weak (t, ωI , ωH)-bisimilar to each other, i.e., λ
w
∼Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH) λ
′,
iff:
(Γ =Ξ,(t,ωI ,ωH) Γ
′) ∧ (
n∑
j=0
∆tj =
n∑
j=0
∆t′j).
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Definition 5 (Cache flow security policy). Given a security level L ∈  L,
ωH ⊆ ΩH , and ωI ⊆ ΩI a VPN G under security environment Ξ is considered
strong cache flow secure iff:
∀λ, λ′ ∈ Λ.(Γ0 =Ξ,(L,ωI ,ωH) Γ
′
0 ⇒ λ
s
∼Ξ,(L,ωI ,ωH) λ
′),
where Γ0 and Γ
′
0 denote the initial configuration of λ and λ
′ respectively, Λ
denotes all runs of components of G. Similarly, the definition of weak cache
flow secure can be given.
Example 3. Consider the model presented in Example 1. Let τv(x) = τv(y) = H ,
τv(m1) = τv(m2) = M , τv(z) = L, and L ⊏ M ⊏ H ∈  L. Let us assume
βi(VM1) = βi(VM2) = ωI , and βh(Host1) = ωH . Communicating cache chan-
nels are thus assigned with security labels regarding the data they transmit:
τc(CAddrkey) = H , τc(CAddrmsg) = M . Note that the state of variable z depends
on the state of cache address of key, and is affected by the communication time
for data transmission between P and Q. Therefore the model does not satisfy the
cache flow security policy since for any given two runs, both the timing condition
and configuration equivalent condition of
w
∼Ξ,(L,ωI ,ωH) are not guaranteed to be
satisfied.
In order to close the cache timing channel, we consider the communication as a
scenario of sending and receiving processes running in parallel with certain time
interleaving data transmission scheme:
Γ ⊢ w ⇓ v w ⇐ CAddra a⇒ CAddra t < T
〈SLEEP(T − t)→ P ⊳ (t := ∆t(a!w ‖ a?x) < T ) ⊲ STOP, Γ 〉
a(w)
−→ 〈P, Γ [σ(x) = v, δ(CAddra) = ∅]〉
(1)
The communicating procedure needs to complete in T time units (together with
sleeping time) and then behaves as P ; the value of w is sent to variable x via
channel a, channel a and the relevant cache lines are then tagged as τc(w). The
communication will be considered as failed if T time units have passed but the
communication has not completed yet. Fixed completion time T prevents the
timing leakage introduced by the cache channel communication.
Example 4. Consider the model presented in Example 1, we rewrite the commu-
nicating procedure as follows:
x := keyGen();
SLEEP(5− t)→ P ′ ⊳ (t := ∆t(key!x ‖ key?y) < 5)⊲ STOP
m1 := encrypt(y, “message”);
SLEEP(5− t)→ Q′ ⊳ (t := ∆t(msg!m1 ‖ msg?m2) < 5)⊲ STOP
The timing condition of weak (t, ωI , ωH)-bisimulation specified in Definition 4
is now ensured, while the configuration condition is still violated. This will be
addressed in next Section.
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5 Flow Security Type System for CSP4v
In order to make the low observation and cache accessing time of the executions
be high input independent, the variables and cache lines are associated with
security labels, VMs and hosts are assigned to categories, rules (semantic +
typing) are required to ensure that: no information flows to lower level objects,
no cache is shared among different VM instances, processes (c.f. instances) are
not allowed to move from a lower order instance (c.f. host) to a higher one, and
cache related operations in communications between processes are forced to be
completed in certain time, and hence the cache flow policy is enforced.
For a process P (w.r.t. a component of G), we consider the type judgements
have the form of:
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{P}Ξ
′
where the type (τ, ωI , ωH) denotes the (environment) counter security levels of
the communication channel/variables and and counter categories of VMs/hosts
participated in the branch events being executed for the purpose of eliminating
implicit flows from the guard. Ξ and Ξ ′ describe the type environment which
hold before and after the execution of P . In general, notation:
Ξ ⊢ (exp :τv te, l :τc tl, l :αc il, i :βi ωI , h :βh ωH)
describes that under type environment Ξ, expression exp and (the address of)
cache line l has type te and tl respectively, l is allocated to VM instance il,
instance i is assigned to a category ωI , and host h is assigned to a category ωH .
The type of an expression including boolean expression is defined by taking the
least upper bound of the types of its free variables as standard:
Ξ ⊢ exp :τv t iff t = ⊔x∈fv(exp)Ξ(τv(x)).
All memory, caches and channels written by a t-level expression becomes tagged
as t-level. Let VarsP and CLinesP denote a set of variables defined in and cache
lines allocated to process P . Typing rules for processes with security configura-
tion are presented in Table 3. Rule TStop for stopping a process P ensures the
cache lines allocated to P to be flushed as empty with a label of system low ⊥
for future use. Rule for assignment TAssign ensures the type of variable x to be
the least upper bound of the type of the assigned expression exp and the counter
level τ . Rule TMove regarding moving a process from one instance to another
enforces the type of each variable and cache line involved in process P to be the
least upper bound of the type of itself and the counter level τ , and ensures its
owner to be the VM identifier i′ where the process is moving to, and ensures cat-
egory of the moving-to-instance to be the least upper bound of that of itself and
the moving-from-instance; rule TMove regarding moving an instance from one
host h to another h′ essentially moves all processes running upon the instance to
h′ such that each of which follows the rule of process moving. Rule for compo-
sition TSeq ensures the typing environment in terms of the sequential event in
a compositional way. Rule for sending operator TSend ensures that the type of
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(TSub )
τ1 ⊢ Ξ1{P}Ξ
′
1
τ2 ⊢ Ξ2{P}Ξ
′
2
τ2 ⊑ τ1, Ξ2 ⊑ Ξ1, Ξ
′
1 ⊑ Ξ
′
2
(TAssign )
Ξ ⊢ exp :τv t
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{x := exp}Ξ
′(x 7→τv τ ⊔ t)
(TStop ) (⊥L,⊥ΩI ,⊥ΩH ) ⊢ Ξ{STOPP }Ξ
′({l 7→τc ⊥ | ∀l ∈ CLinesP })
(TSkip ) (⊥L,⊥ΩI ,⊥ΩH ) ⊢ Ξ{SKIP}Ξ
(TMove )
Ξ ⊢ ({x :τv tx, l :τc tl, l :αc i | ∀x ∈ VarsP , l ∈ CLinesP }), i :βi ω, i
′ :βi ω
′
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{MOVEP (i
′)}Ξ ′({x 7→τv tx ⊔ τ, l 7→τc tl ⊔ τ, l 7→αc i
′
| ∀x ∈ VarsP , l ∈ CLinesP }, i 7→βi ⊔{ω, ω
′, ωI})
h : [[I ]].MI I = 〈i : [[P1]], i : [[P2]], . . . , i : [[Pn]]〉
h′ : [[I ′]].MI′ I
′ = 〈i′ : [[P ′1]], i
′ : [[P ′2]], . . . , i
′ : [[P ′n]]〉
Ξ ⊢ h :βh ω Ξ ⊢ h
′ :βh ω
′
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ1{MOVEP1(i
′)}Ξ ′1 . . . (τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξn{MOVEPn(i
′)}Ξ ′n
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ 〈Ξ1, Ξ2, . . . , Ξn〉{MOVEI(h
′)}〈Ξ ′1, Ξ
′
2, . . . , Ξ
′
n〉(h 7→ ⊔{ω, ω
′, ωH})
(TSeq )
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{P}Ξ
′ (τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ
′{Q}Ξ ′′
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{P ;Q}Ξ
′′
(TSend )
Ξ ⊢ w :τv t w⇐ CAddra
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{a!w}Ξ
′(CAddra 7→τc τ ⊔ t)
(TRecv )
Ξ ⊢ CAddra :τc t
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{a?x}Ξ
′(x 7→τv τ ⊔ t)
(TBranch )
Ξ ⊢ b :τv t
(t ⊔ τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{P}Ξ
′
P
(t ⊔ τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{Q}Ξ
′
Q
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{P ⊳ b⊲Q}Ξ
′
Ξ ′ = Ξ ′P ⊔Ξ
′
Q
(TLoop )
Ξi ⊢ b :τv ti
(ti ⊔ τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξi{P}Ξ
′
i i = 0, . . . , n
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{b⊳ (P )
∗}Ξ ′n
Ξ0 = Ξ, Ξi+1 = Ξ
′
i ⊔Ξ, Ξn+1 = Ξ
′
n
(TPar )
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{P}Ξ
′ (τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{Q}Ξ
′′
Ξ ′ ⊢ ({x :τv t
′
x, l :τc t
′
l | ∀x ∈ Vars, l ∈ CLines})
Ξ ′′ ⊢ ({x :τv t
′′
x, l :τc t
′′
l i | ∀x ∈ Vars, l ∈ CLines})
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{P‖Q}Ξ
′′′({x 7→τv t
′
x ⊔ t
′′
x, l 7→τc t
′
l ⊔ t
′′
l | ∀x ∈ Vars, l ∈ CLines})
Table 3. Typing rules for processes with security configuration.
the cache channel for sending expression w is to be the least upper bound of the
type of w and the counter level, and rule for receiving operator TRecv ensures
that the type of the receiving variable x is to be the least upper bound of the
type of channel and the counter level. Rule for branch event TBranch specifies
that the typing environment is required to be enforced in terms of the branch
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body with the counter level being the least upper bound of the current counter
level and the type of the guard. Rule for loop operator TLoop calculates the
least fixed point of the type environment transition function on the security lat-
tice. Rule for parallel operator TPar ensures that the type of each information
container (including process variables and cache lines) is to be the least upper
bound after the execution of each parallel process.
In overall, the derivation rule (τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{P}Ξ
′ ensures that:
– variables and cache lines whose final types in Ξ ′ are less than τ must not be
changed by P ;
– the final value of a variable (or a cache line) say x whose final type is Ξ ′(x) =
t must not depend on the initial values of those variables (or cache lines) say
z whose initial type Ξ(z) is greater than t.
– processes (c.f. instances) belonging to a higher order category instances (c.f.
host) must not move to an instance (c.f. a host) with a lower order category.
Theorem 1 (Monotonicity of the type environment transition func-
tion). Given  L and P , for all τ , ωI , ωH and Ξ, the type environment transition
function: TP, L(Ξ, (τ, ωI , ωH)) 7→ Ξ
′ regarding (τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{P}Ξ ′ is mono-
tone.
Proof. The proof is obtained by induction on the semantic structure of the pro-
cess. Particularly, for the case of loop, the sequences of Ξ ′0, Ξ
′
1, Ξ
′
2, . . . and Ξ
′′
0 ,
Ξ ′′1 , Ξ
′′
2 , . . . form ascending chains with a least upper bound due to the finiteness
of  L, so rule TLoop calculates the least fixed point of TP, L on  L. 
Definition 6 (Semantic flow security condition). We say the semantic
relation of P satisfies (τ, ωI , ωH)-flow security property (denoted by φτ,ωI ,ωH ),
written as: (Ξ{P}Ξ ′) |= φτ,ωI ,ωH , iff:
i) for all Γ , Γ ′, x and l:
〈P, Γ 〉 ⇓ Γ ′ ∧ Ξ ′ ⊏ (τ, ωI , ωH) ⇒ Γ (σ(x)) = Γ
′(σ(x)) ∧ Γ (δ(l)) = Γ ′(δ(l));
where we abuse notation Γ (σ(x)), Γ (δ(l)) to denote σ(x), δ(l) in configura-
tion Γ .
ii) and for all t ∈  L, o ∈ ΩI , o′ ∈ ΩH , Γ1 and Γ2:
Γ1 =Ξ,(t,o,o′) Γ2 ⇒ Γ
′
1 =Ξ,(t,o,o′) Γ
′
2.
We say the flow security type system is sound if the well-typed system is flow se-
cure, more precisely, whenever (τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{P}Ξ ′ then the semantic relation
of P is flow secure.
Theorem 2 (Soundness of the flow security type system). The type sys-
tem proposed in Table 3 is sound, i.e.,
(τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{P}Ξ
′ ⇒ (Ξ{P}Ξ ′) |= φτ,ωI ,ωH .
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Proof. Since τ ⊢ Ξ{P}Ξ ′ ensures that: for all variables and cache lines x, when-
ever Ξ ′(x) ⊏ τ then there are no assignments to x in P , and thus i) is clearly
satisfied; and for any variables y, such that Ξ(y) ⊐ Ξ ′(x), the final value of
x does not depend on the initial values of y, we can then prove for all t ∈  L,
o ∈ ΩI , o′ ∈ ΩH , configurations Γ and Γ ′ such that 〈P, Γ 〉 ⇓ Γ ′, whenever
Γ1 =Ξ,(τ,ωI ,ωH) Γ2 then Γ
′
1 =Ξ,(τ,ωI ,ωH) Γ
′
2, by induction on the structure of the
derivation tree. 
Theorem 3 (Flow secure of communications). Given a CSP4v model A,
for all P running upon any VM i of any host h in A, if (Ξ{P}Ξ ′) |= φτ,ωI ,ωH ,
then A is weak cache flow secure with L = τ .
Proof. The proof includes two parts in terms of the definition of weak cache flow
security policy given in Definition 5: channel of timing observable behaviours of
victim process, and channel of observable low outputs influenced by high inputs.
The first part is ensured by the semantics of communications specified in (1),
which must be completed in certain time, and the second part is ensured by the
soundness of the type system presented in Theorem 2. 
Example 5. Consider again the model presented in Example 1 and 3. It is clear
that (τ, ωI , ωH) ⊢ Ξ{R}Ξ ′ does not hold since the assignment to z make Ξ ′(z) >
Ξ(z); while Ξ{R}Ξ ′ |= φτ,ωI ,ωH holds if the communication between P and Q
fails and Ξ{R}Ξ ′ 6|= φτ,ωI ,ωH holds otherwise.
6 Related Work
This paper relates to the topic of information flow analysis in virtualised com-
puting systems from perspective of formal languages with a concern of cache
timing attacks.
Cross-VM side-channel attacks in virtualised infrastructure allowed the at-
tacker to extract information from a target VM and stole confidential infor-
mation from the victims [24,32,33]. Over the last decade, there have been sus-
tained efforts in exploring solutions to defend cache channel attacks in virtu-
alised computing environment via the approaches of cache partition at either
hardware-level [30,31,6,15] or system-level [21,26,14,34,17], and the approaches of
cache randomisation via introducing randomization in cache uses through either
new hardware design [29,30,31,18,16,23] or compiler-assistant design [7,16,4,22].
Wang and Lee [30] identified cache interference as the main cause of different
types of cache side channel attacks. Security-aware cache designs were proposed
to mitigate the cache interference issue: Partition-Locked cache (PLcache) elim-
inated cache interference via preventing cache sharing in a flexible way, and
Random Permutation cache (RPcache) allowed cache sharing but randomised
cache interference so that no information can be deduced. More recently, Liu et.
al. [17] developed CATalyst to defend cache-based side channel attacks for the
cloud computing system. Specifically, CATalyst used Cache Allocation Technol-
ogy (CAT) on Intel processors to partition the last-level cache into secure and
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non-secure partitions. The secure partition was loaded with cache-pinned secure
pages and was software-managed, while the non-secure partition can be freely
used by any applications and kept hardware-managed. Security-sensitive code
and data can be loaded and locked by users via mapping them to the cache-
pinned pages. Thus a hybrid hardware-software managed cache was constructed
to protect the sensitive code and data. However, these efforts mostly require
significant changes to the hardware, hypervisors, or operating systems, which
make them impractical to be deployed in current cloud data centres. Formal
treatment on flow security policies upon side-channel attack detection, leverag-
ing program analysis techniques and relevant tools are still needed in order to
improve the accuracy and applicability of leakage analysis and control in the
virtualised infrastructure. In this paper, we address the flow security issue in
virtualised computing environment from perspective of programming language
and program analysis techniques.
On the other hand, there have been lasting investigations on flow property
specification and enforcement via approaches of formal language and analysis.
The conception of information flow specifies the security requirements of the sys-
tem where no sensitive information should be released to the observer during its
executions. Denning and Denning [5] first used program analysis to investigate
if the information flow properties of a program satisfy a specified multi-level
security policy. Goguen and Meseguer [8] formalised the notion of absence of
information flow with the concept of non-interference. Ryan and Schneider [25]
took a step towards the generalisation of a CSP formulation of non-interference
to handle information flows through the concept of process equivalence. Security
type systems [28,19,11,20,12,2,13] had been substantially used to formulate the
analysis of secure information flow in programs. In addition to type-based treat-
ments of secure information flow analysis for programs, Clark et. al presented
a flow logic approach in [3], Amtoft and Banerjee proposed a Hoare-like logic
for program dependence in [1]. Hammer and Snelting [9] presented an approach
for information flow control in program analysis based on program dependence
graphs (PDG). Based on [9], [27] extended the PDG-based flow analysis by in-
corporating refinement techniques via path conditions to improve the precision
of the flow control. Such PDG-based information flow control is more precise but
more expensive than type-based approaches. However, none of the above works
has addressed the issue of flow analysis in virtualised computing systems regard-
ing observations on both executions of communicating processes and affections
of cache timing channels.
7 Conclusions
We have proposed a language-based approach for information leakage analysis
and control in virtualised computing infrastructure with a concern of cache tim-
ing attacks. Specifically, we have introduced a distributed process algebra with
processes able to capture flow security characters in a virtualised environment;
we have described a cache flow policy for leakage analysis through communica-
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tion covert channels; and we have presented a type system of the language to
enforce the flow policy. In our future work, we plan to derive concrete implemen-
tation of our approach and to extend the current model to define and enforce
more practical security policies.
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